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A League of Their Own: 
Landmark Supreme Court Judgment Clears Irish League of 
Credit Unions of Abuse of Dominance. 
 
 
Abstract: In a unanimous judgment handed down on 8th May 2007, the Irish Supreme 
Court upheld an appeal by the Irish League of Credit Unions (ILCU) against a High 
Court judgment that ILCU had abused a dominant position. The Irish Competition 
Authority had alleged that ILCU had abused its dominant position in the market for 
savings protection services (SPS) by limiting access to SPS services to its own members. 
The Authority claimed that credit unions wishing to obtain SPS services were required to 
also purchase credit union representation services from ILCU and that such tying 
amounted to an abuse of dominance by ILCU. This was the first abuse of dominance case 
brought by the Irish Competition Authority to go to a full hearing, the first to be appealed 
to the Supreme Court and the first Irish case under EC Regulation 1/2003. The case 
raised a number of interesting economic issues, which are of interest in the context of the 
debate on the need for a more economics based approach to Article 82. It has also 





In a unanimous judgment delivered on 8 May 2007, the Irish Supreme Court found 
that the Irish League of Credit Unions (ILCU) had not abused a dominant position by 
refusing to grant access to its savings protection scheme (SPS) to non-ILCU credit 
unions, overturning an earlier High Court judgment.1 The case was notable for a number 
of reasons. It was the first abuse of dominance case brought by the Competition 
Authority to go to a full hearing and the first such case to be appealed to the Supreme 
Court. The case raised a number of interesting economic issues, particularly with respect 
to the treatment of market definition and refusal to supply by a dominant firm, which are 
of interest in the context of the debate on the need for a more economics based approach 
to Article 82.2 It was also the first Irish case under Regulation/1/2003 and so is of interest 
in the context of the decentralised application of EU competition law.3 It has also resulted 
in some significant innovations in the hearing of competition cases by the Irish courts. 
The case arose out of a decision by ILCU to disaffiliate a number of member credit 
unions for refusing to purchase certain types of insurance cover from ILCU’s own 
insurance subsidiary, ECCU Ltd. The Competition Authority originally claimed that this 
action was anti-competitive. It subsequently altered its position and claimed that ILCU’s 
refusal to grant non-member credit unions access to the SPS created an entry barrier to 
what the Authority described as the market for “credit union representation services”, 
thereby preventing the entry of rival providers of such services and restricting 
competition in that market. The Authority argued that this amounted to an abuse of a 
dominant position by ILCU. When the case came to trial the Authority introduced a new 
line of argument, claiming that restricting access to the SPS to member credit unions 
amounted to anti-competitive tying on the grounds that any credit union wishing to obtain 
                                                 
1 Competition Authority v. John O’Regan & Others, High Court Kearns, J. 22 October 2004, Supreme 
Court 8 May 2007. ILCU is an unincorporated body and its directors were nominated as defendants. For 
convenience the present paper refers to the defendants as ILCU. 
2 See, for example, D.G. Competition, (2005), Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 to 
Exclusionary Abuses, Brussels: EU Commission; and J. Vickers, (2005): Abuse of Market Power, 
Economic Journal, 115: F244-61. 
3 Regulation 1/2003 provides that national competition authorities must apply EU competition law where a 
case involves inter state trade using their existing national competition law procedures. In Ireland decisions 
on whether or not there has been a breach of competition law are a matter for the courts. Three agencies 
have been designated as national competition authorities for the purposes of the Regulation, namely the 
Competition Authority; the Courts and the Director of Public Prosecutions. 
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the benefit of the SPS was also required to purchase credit union representation services 
from ILCU. The High Court accepted the Authority’s argument that there were two 
separate markets and held that ILCU had abused its dominant position by tying credit 
union representation services to the provision of SPS services. ILCU then appealed the 
judgment to the Supreme Court. 
 
2. Development of Credit Unions in Ireland. 
A credit union is defined as an individual autonomous savings and credit cooperative 
established by individuals who have a common bond. The Credit Union Act, 1997, 
requires that all credit unions must be registered by the Registrar of Friendly Societies 
(since replaced by the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland 
(CBFSAI)) and no entity may use the term credit union unless it is registered. The 1997 
Act provides that individuals may only join a particular credit union if they have a 
common bond with the other members. The most usual type of common bond is that of 
living or working within a particular community. The bulk of the remaining credit unions 
are credit unions involving individuals working for a particular organisation, i.e. the 
common bond involves working for a particular company or industry.  
Credit unions pool the savings of their members and provide loans to them. They 
compete with other financial institutions such as banks, building societies, insurance 
companies in the personal savings and lending markets. The average size of loan 
provided by credit unions at the time the Authority commenced proceedings in 2003 was 
€6,700. In many instances credit unions provide loans on attractive terms to individuals 
who might not be catered for by other financial institutions for various reasons.   
ILCU was originally established in 1960 when four credit unions came together to try 
and ensure that credit unions would conduct their affairs on the basis of a set of agreed 
operating principles and to present a united front to government and state agencies in 
relation to the legislative problems of credit unions. According to its 2003 Annual 
Report, ILCU had 532 affiliated credit unions throughout the island of Ireland with an 
estimated total membership of 2.7m individuals. 431 of ILCU affiliated credit unions 
were located within the Republic of Ireland and they had a total membership of 2.3m 
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individuals.4 The balance of ILCU membership consists of credit unions located in 
Northern Ireland. 
In 1968 ILCU established a savings protection scheme (SPS). The SPS is not a deposit 
insurance or savings guarantee scheme. No credit union has any guarantee that it will be 
rescued by the SPS if it is in financial difficulties and members of credit unions have no 
guarantee that their savings will be secure by virtue of the SPS. At ILCU’s discretion 
loans may be advanced from the SPS fund to member credit unions that are in financial 
difficulties. There is also a discretionary power to pay individual credit union members 
up to €12,700 from the SPS fund in the event of a collapse of a credit union. All ILCU 
member credit unions are required to participate in the SPS; while participation in the 
SPS is confined to credit unions which are ILCU members. Credit unions participating in 
the SPS must permit ILCU to inspect and monitor their activities and comply with 
reserve requirements, operating ratios, insurance requirements, and such other operational 
and management standards as may be set down by ILCU. 
The 1997 Credit Union Act provides that, any credit union established after 1st August, 
2001 is obliged to either operate or participate in a SPS, which must be approved by the 
CBFSAI.5 Section 47 of the Credit Union Act, 1997, also obliges credit unions to insure 
against any losses arising from fraud or dishonesty by its officers or volunteers. 
 Since 1976 ILCU has provided loan protection/life savings (LP/LS) to its member 
credit unions through its wholly owned subsidiary, ECCU, which is an authorised 
insurer.6 At the time of the case all ILCU member credit unions were required to obtain 
LP/LS cover from ECCU. ILCU rules provide that member credit unions may be 
expelled by the board of directors for breaches of its rules.  
Sometime around 2000/2001 disputes arose within ILCU after it incurred large costs 
in the unsuccessful development of IT systems for credit unions. In 2001 a number of 
credit unions established a new representative body, the Credit Union Development 
                                                 
4 It is believed that there were less than 10 credit unions operating in the Republic of Ireland that were not 
members of ILCU. 
5 At the time of the High Court hearing, ILCU had applied to have its SPS approved but the CBFSAI had 
not taken a decision on the application. 
6 LP/LS insurance pays off any outstanding loans of an individual credit union member on the death of that 
member, although there are limits on the amounts covered in the case of individuals over a certain age, and 
pays up to twice the level of a deceased member’s savings to their next of kin. 
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Association (CUDA). CUDA had 21 member credit unions in 2002 although its members 
were generally larger than most of the ICLU member credit unions.7  
Up to 2004, the activities of ILCU were funded by surpluses earned by ECCU, most of 
whose income came from the provision of LP/LS insurance to member credit unions. 
Around 2000/2001 a number of credit unions, mainly CUDA members, decided to 
purchase LP/LS insurance from insurers other than ECCU as they were unhappy with the 
level of premiums being charged by ECCU. Some voluntarily disaffiliated, In January 
2003, ILCU wrote to twelve credit unions indicating that it proposed to disaffiliate them 
for failing to purchase LP/LS insurance from ECCU.  
 
3. Background to the Case 
Following the passage of the Competition Act, 1991, ILCU notified its rules to the 
Competition Authority.8 In a decision dated 20th November 1995, the Authority found 
that the obligation for ILCU members to purchase LP/LS insurance from ECCU was not 
anti-competitive. The Authority concluded that the relevant market was the market for 
life insurance and ECCU had less than 1% of that market and the arrangements could not 
therefore have any impact on competition.  
CUDA subsequently complained to the Authority that the LP/LS requirement was 
anti-competitive as it prevented credit unions from obtaining cheaper LP/LS insurance 
from other sources. On 28th June 2002, the Authority revoked its earlier decision clearing 
these arrangements, citing changes in circumstances since the original decision.9 In 
particular it argued that the emergence of some ILCU members who now objected to the 
LP/LS arrangements and the fact that participation in SPS had been made compulsory 
constituted a change in circumstances.  
Following a complaint by CUDA, the Authority wrote to ILCU stating that, in its 
view, disaffiliating credit unions for purchasing LP/LS insurance from an insurer other 
than ECCU would constitute an abuse of a dominant position. The Authority 
                                                 
7 Although CUDA members accounted for only 4% of all credit unions, they accounted for 14% of credit 
union membership and 15% of total credit union assets. 
8 The Competition Act, 1991, established a system for parties to notify agreements and request a certificate 
(negative clearance) or licence (exemption). The Competition Act, 2002, abolished the notification system. 
9 The Competition Act, 2002, which came into force three days later on 1st July 2002, revoked all 
certificates issued under the 1991 Act.  
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subsequently instituted legal proceedings in July 2003. The case came before the High 
Court in June 2004. 
 
4. The Authority’s Case. 
The Authority wrote to ILCU’s solicitors on 4 April 2003 suggesting, for the first 
time, that the conduct of ILCU (in relation to the supply of LP/LS) “might constitute a 
breach of section 5 in the market for representation of credit unions, where ILCU 
arguably holds a dominant position”.10 In a subsequent letter dated 27 May 2003, the 
Authority indicated that it was not stating that ILCU could not make LP/LS insurance 
mandatory or disaffiliate members for not complying with that rule. Instead it argued that 
the breach of section 5 arose from the associated loss of access and/or no refund from the 
SPS. 
The Authority claimed that the loss of access to the SPS as a result of disaffiliation 
imposed an exit cost on ILCU member credit unions that discouraged them from leaving 
ILCU to join rival credit union representation undertakings, such as CUDA, and that it 
therefore unlawfully raised a barrier to entry for rival credit union representation 
undertakings. It thus argued that the refusal by ILCU to supply access to the SPS to non-
member or disaffiliated credit unions constituted an abuse of its dominant position in the 
market for credit union representation.  
At the trial hearing, the Authority put forward a somewhat different argument. It 
suggested that there were two relevant markets: - a market for SPS services and a market 
for credit union representation services. It argued that the fact that access to the SPS was 
limited to credit unions that were members of ILCU amounted to an illegal tying 
arrangement whereby credit unions wishing to participate in the SPS were forced to 
purchase credit union representation services from ILCU. Alternatively the Authority 
suggested that the rules amounted to a refusal to supply SPS services to credit unions that 
were not members of ILCU. The defence chose not to object to the Authority changing its 
case at trial. The High Court accepted the Authority’s argument that there were two 
separate markets and held that ILCU had abused its dominant position by tying credit 
                                                 
10 Supreme Court judgment at 16. 
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union representation services to the provision of SPS services. ILCU then appealed the 
judgment to the Supreme Court which overturned the High Court judgment. 
 
5. The Relevant Market 
As is frequently true in abuse of dominance cases, market definition played a key role 
in the ILCU case. The Authority’s statement of claim defined the relevant market as the 
market for “credit union representation services”. It defined such services as the entire 
composite of all ILCU services including advocacy, lobbying, financial services and the 
SPS. At the trial, the Authority put forward a different argument and claimed that there 
were two relevant markets, a market for SPS and a market for credit union representation 
services which it re-defined as comprising all ILCU services except SPS. The case raised 
issues about the methodology applied by the Authority and the courts to define the 
relevant market as well as the market definitions advanced by the Authority. 
 
(a) Defining the Relevant Market. 
In its Statement of Claim, the Competition Authority argued that “credit unions would 
not switch away from the purchase of specialist credit union representation services, such 
as those provided by ILCU, in response to a small but significant non-transitory increase 
in the price of those products or services.” (Emphasis added). 
The wording used clearly echoes the language of the standard economic test for 
market definition, the SSNIP test, which asks whether a hypothetical monopolist could 
impose a small significant non-transitory increase in price, but the Authority cited no 
empirical evidence in support of its contention and failed to define what was meant by 
the price of such services.11 The report of the Authority’s expert economist stated that he 
was unaware of any quantitative economic study that sought to estimate demand 
elasticities for the various services provided by ILCU for the purposes of establishing a 
market definition. 
                                                 
11 The bulk of ILCU’s income which it used to finance its activities came from insurance commissions and 
surplus earnings of ECCU, while member credit unions paid a nominal affiliation fee in respect of their 
individual members. The present author who was an expert economist for ILCU suggested that the price 
could be measured by dividing ILCU’s total income by the total number of credit union members to obtain 
a cost per member, or alternatively the price of LP/LS insurance was the relevant price. 
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ILCU’s expert economist argued that if ILCU sought to impose a 5% price increase, 
the likelihood was that it would lose a sufficient number of customers as to render the 
price increase unprofitable suggesting that for a 5% price increase the critical loss was 
around 7.5%.12 A low critical loss is an indication that the product market has been 
defined too narrowly as the likelihood is that the actual loss in sales that might be 
expected as a result of a 5% price increase would exceed the critical loss.13 The CUDA 
credit unions were unlikely to pay such an increase, given that they had already expressed 
dissatisfaction with the cost of LP/LS insurance provided by ECCU.14 As CUDA 
accounted for 15% of all credit union members, this would render such a price increase 
unprofitable.  
The Authority argued in the High Court that the SSNIP test was only one of the 
possible tests of market definition, citing the EU Commission decision in Virgin/British 
Airways. It urged the Court to apply the characteristics test which the Authority argued 
indicated that credit union representation services, (excluding SPS), constituted a relevant 
product market.15 The judge agreed, ruling that “having considered both the SSNIP test 
and the economic evidence regarding market definition, I prefer to adopt the ‘intuitive’ or 
‘innate characteristics’ test to find that there are two markets at work in the instant case 
being respectively a market for credit union representation services (excluding SPS), and 
the savings protection market.”16  
In this respect the judgement is in line with a number of previous Irish court 
judgements which have relied on the subjective ‘innate characteristics’ test rather than 
quantitative economic evidence. In Mars/HB, Keane J defined the market as being that 
                                                 
12 Estimates of critical loss are commonly used to apply the SSNIP test. The critical loss is defined as the 
maximum loss in sales that could be incurred as a result of a 5% price increase such that profits would be 
unchanged on their previous level. If evidence suggests that the likely loss in sales would exceed the 
critical loss, then a 5% price increase would not be profitable which means that the products involved do 
not constitute a relevant product market. For a more detailed description of critical loss see P. Massey and 
D. Daly, (2003): Competition and Regulation in Ireland The Law and Economics, Dublin: Oak Tree Press, 
chapter 5.  
13 O’Brien and Wickelgren caution, however, that a low critical loss cannot be regarded as definitive 
evidence that a wider market definition is required. D. O’Brien and A. Wickelgren, (2003): A Critical 
Analysis of Critical Loss Analysis, Washington DC, Federal Trade Commission. 
14 The price for LP/LS insurance effectively included a price for ILCU services. 
15 Virgin/British Airways case No. (T219/99) OJ 2000 L30/1; [2000] CMLR 999. The SSNIP test is the 
only test of market definition set out by the Competition Authority Notice in Respect of Guidelines for 
Merger Analysis, 16 December 2002.  
16 High Court judgment at 131. 
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for impulse ice-cream products “largely on what has been described as the ‘common 
sense’ or ‘innate characteristics’ test” and stated: “I do not think that someone going into 
a confectioner’s or newsagent to buy an ice cream who finds the cabinet temporarily 
empty would treat their appetite as slaked by a can of coke or a bag of crisps.”17
In Ballina Mineral Water Company v. Heineken18 Kearns, J., who was also the judge 
in the ILCU High Court case, held that lager did not constitute a separate product market 
and was part of the wider beer market. Referring to the ECJ judgement in United Brands 
he stated: “Again, one can, I think...substitute the word ‘lager’ there for the word 
‘banana’ and other beer products for other fruit products, and one arrives at a situation 
where on the application of that test, it seems to me that the appropriate market definition 
or product market is the beer market.”19
The preference shown by the Irish courts for subjective tests to define markets is 
highly unsatisfactory. Massey and Daly have pointed out that such tests inevitably 
introduce considerable uncertainty into the process, are unlikely by their nature to take all 
relevant variables into account, and increase the likelihood of error.20 Neven et. al. have 
criticised the EU Commission for relying “on qualitative assertions and hunches even 
when more quantitative evidence could have been made available” in dominance cases.21 
The EU Commission has correctly pointed out that the SSNIP test may be unreliable in 
dominance cases observing that: “It is necessary to rely on a variety of methods for 
checking the robustness of possible alternative market definitions.”22 Even allowing for 
such shortcomings, relying on intuitive tests that support a narrower market definition 
appears problematic. As NERA observed with regard to the Commission decision in 
Virgin/British Airways: “Any statement to the effect that SSNIP is just one example of 
how to define a relevant market without clearly specifying what the alternative to SSNIP 
                                                 
17 Masterfoods t/a Mars v. HB Ice Cream Ltd., [1993] ILRM 145. 
18 Ballina Mineral Water Company v. Heineken Ireland Limited, Kearns, J., 31.5.2002. It should be noted, 
however, that the plaintiff in this case put forward no expert economic evidence to support its claim that 
lager was the relevant product market. 
19 Competition, Vol.11(5), p151. 
20 Massey and Daly above note 12. 
21 D. Neven, R. Nuttall and P. Seabright, (1998): The Merger Decisions of the European Commission in L. 
Phlips ed., Applied Industrial Economics, Cambridge University Press. 
22 DG Competition (2005), above note 2 at 7. 
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might be, clearly runs the risk of a return to a process of market definition by ad hoc 
reference to product characteristics.”23
The Supreme Court in its judgement on the ILCU appeal offered some support for this 
position. Delivering the Court’s judgment, Mr Justice Fennelly observed: “If it is to arise 
in another case, I would hope that the Authority would produce cogent factual evidence 
of the existence of such a product market in representation services.”24 While admittedly 
obiter dicta it, nevertheless, suggests that quantitative evidence is to be favoured in 
respect of market definition. 
 
(b) SPS as a Separate Market. 
Although the Authority had originally claimed that SPS was part of “representation 
services”, at the High Court trial it contended that there were in fact two relevant 
markets, one for SPS services and one for credit union representation services. The report 
of the Authority’s expert argued that SPS constituted a separate market because a credit 
union that did not have SPS cover might lose business and this would probably make it 
willing to pay a price even ten percent above the competitive level for SPS, although no 
empirical evidence was cited to support this claim. Rather the Authority’s expert 
economist argued that “even in the absence of quantitative data, it seems reasonable to 
argue that both representation services and SPS may be considered distinct relevant 
markets.”25  
The High Court accepted the Authority’s revised argument that “there are two markets 
at work in the instant case being respectively a market for credit union representation 
services (excluding SPS), and the savings protection market.”26  
The Supreme Court noted that the existence of two separate markets had not been 
included in the list of issues to be decided dated 18 June 2004, although the trial 
commenced on June 22. “The concept of a market for SPS was first introduced in the 
                                                 
23 NERA, (2001): The Role of Market Definition in Monopoly and Dominance Inquiries, Office of Fair 
Trading, Economic Discussion Paper 2, London: Office of Fair Trading., at 19 
24 Supreme Court judgment at 55. 
25 Competition Authority v. Irish League of Credit Unions Economic Effects on Competition of the Rules 
and Practices of the ILCU, P. Seabright, 24 May 2004, mimeo., at 2. 
26 High Court judgment at 131. 
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expert report of Professor Seabright on behalf of the Authority. That report was dated 24 
May 2004 and was delivered shortly before the hearing.”27
The Supreme Court found that the Authority had failed to establish that SPS 
constituted a distinct product and a distinct product market which it noted was essential 
for the Authority’s claim of abusive tying to succeed. Mr. Justice Fennelly stated: “To 
consider that the representation services and SPS, which has always been provided to 
their own members, are distinct products is counter-intuitive. In my view it is 
artificial.”28
The judgement went on to point out that there was no evidence of an independent 
commercially provided SPS anywhere in the world 
 
(c) The ‘Credit Union Representation Services’ Market. 
In his evidence to the High Court, ILCU’s expert economist observed that 
“representation services” were not purchased through the market from firms or 
individuals providing such services. Instead those engaged in a particular industry or 
profession generally established their own representative body, whose activities were 
overseen by representatives of firms in the industry or profession, while employing staff 
to carry out day to day activities. Citing the Coasian argument that firms and markets 
were alternative ways of providing goods and services, he argued that the reason why 
groups established their own representative body and did not purchase such services 
through the market was attributable to the fact that transaction costs meant that it was not 
possible to purchase such services through the market.29  
This argument was rejected by the High Court on the grounds that the proposition “if 
correct, would provide a wide range of activities with a shield against competition law 
scrutiny”.30 The judge went on to state that because firms have an option to provide 
services on an in-house basis, and choose to do so, does not prevent the existence of a 
market, again citing the Commission decision in Virgin/British Airways.31  
                                                 
27 Supreme Court judgment at 21. 
28 Id. at 51. 
29 R. Coase, (1937): The Nature of the Firm, Economica, 4, 386-405. 
30 High Court judgment at 108. 
31 Above note 16. 
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“This practice in the air transport industry creates a market in air travel agency 
services, which are purchased from travel agents by airlines. The fact that airlines 
are increasing their efforts to perform these activities themselves, in effect to 
perform these services “in-house” rather than buying the services of travel agents, 
does not alter the fact that this is a distinct market. There are many markets where 
customers have the option of producing some or all of their requirements for a 
product themselves. This does not prevent there being a relevant market for these 
products, but does affect the market power of the various suppliers and 
purchasers.”32
In contrast to Virgin/British Airways, where airlines could purchase services from 
travel agents or provide the same services in-house, the defence argument in ILCU was 
that there were no independent providers of representation services. Trade and 
professional associations were established by their members because this was the only 
way in which representation services could be provided. There was no example of a trade 
or professional body ‘purchasing’ representation services on an arms length basis from a 
separate undertaking. Those credit unions that were dissatisfied with ILCU had chosen to 
establish their own representative body rather than purchase ‘representation services’ 
from a third party. This argument was supported by evidence from an expert on the US 
credit union movement that there had never been any third-party providers of 
representation services to credit unions in the United States other than credit union 
leagues.  
The view that credit union representation services constituted a relevant market, which 
was accepted by the High Court, had potentially far reaching implications. Such an 
interpretation would mean that arguably any trade association or representative body 
could be considered dominant in the provision of representation services to its members. 
In a presentation to the Oireachtas (Parliamentary) Public Accounts Committee, the 
Authority Chairman stated: “This case has implications way beyond credit unions. What 
the High Court decides in terms of monopolisation of representative services will be 
                                                 
32 High Court judgement at 102. 
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relevant to a wide range of other markets, including legal services where monopoly 
representation exists at the moment.”33  
While noting that it was not necessary to deal with the question of whether there was a 
market for credit union representation services, once it had held that there was no market 
for SPS services, the Supreme Court nevertheless addressed that issue stating that it 
found “it troubling that any and every association of business undertakings should be 
held, for the purposes of competition law, automatically to be engaged in a business 
consisting of the provision of services for reward.”34 It referred to the evidence of 
ILCU’s economic expert that one did not find ‘suppliers of representation services 
generally’ which might be expected if there were a market for representation services. 
Instead “representative services” were “provided by representative organisations 
comprising their own members”.  All sorts of organisations had concluded that it was not 
possible to buy adequate representation services in the market and there was therefore no 
such market. Mr. Justice Fennelly stated: “This seems to me to represent common sense 
observation.”35   
The Authority’s economic expert also claimed that credit union representation services 
appeared to have the characteristics of ‘two-sided’ or ‘matching’ markets, i.e. one in 
which the parties on either side need the help of some intermediary to identify suitable 
counterparties.36 The fact that credit unions had established and operated their own 
representative body indicated that they had no need for such intermediation. 
 
6. Dominance. 
The High Court found that ILCU was dominant in both the SPS and credit union 
representation markets. As the Supreme Court found that neither of these constituted a 
relevant product market it decided that it was not necessary to deal with the issue of 
dominance or abuse. The High Court findings on dominance nevertheless raise a number 
of issues. 
                                                 
33 Committee of Public Accounts, Hearing of 22 July 2004. 
34 Supreme Court judgment at 53. 
35 Id. at 54. 
36 See, J-C. Rochet and J. Tirole, (2003): Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, Journal of the 
European Economic Association, 1(4): 902-1029. 
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The defence cited evidence that ILCU had been forced to revise its pricing strategy as 
a result of the decision by a number of member credit unions to purchase LP/LS 
insurance cover other than through ECCU and argued that this was a clear indication that 
it was not dominant, citing the European Court of Justice judgement in Hoffman 
LaRoche: “..the fact that an undertaking is compelled by the pressure of its competitors’ 
price reductions to lower its own prices is in general incompatible with that independent 
conduct which is the hallmark of a dominant position”. 37
This argument was rejected by the High Court which ruled that: “Furthermore, one 
can only see the revision of its pricing policy by ILCU as a form of back-tracking on an 
aggressive pricing policy in the credit union representation services market which is 
being belatedly undertaken in an attempt to either drive out or weaken ILCU's main rival, 
CUDA, from that market.”38
The Authority never claimed that ILCU had engaged in predatory pricing, nor was it 
ever suggested that the revised pricing and funding arrangements adopted by ILCU 
resulted in it selling at a loss. The change in pricing policy would appear therefore to 
represent a response to competitive pressures. The fact that changes in pricing behaviour 
in response to entry should be considered as an attempt to eliminate or weaken a rival, 
absent any evidence of predation, is worrying.  
  
7. Abuse of Dominance. 
(a) The Need for SPS Services 
Key to the Authority’s case was its claim that credit unions would not be able to 
compete without access to SPS and the fact that they would lose such access if they 
ceased to be members of ILCU deterred them from leaving ILCU and joining a rival 
organisation, thereby preventing competition in what the Authority described as the 
market for credit union representation services.  
ILCU argued that the fact that a number of individual credit unions had decided to 
purchase LP/LS insurance other than through ECCU, knowing that this could result in 
their disaffiliation from ILCU indicated that the SPS did not constitute a barrier to exit. In 
                                                 
37 Case C-85/76 Hoffman LaRoche v. Commission [1979] ECR 461. 
38 High Court judgment at 157 
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support of this argument it cited a memo prepared for the board of one credit union which 
stated: “A consequence of obtaining LP/LS from other than the League appears to be 
disaffiliation. … We do not have a problem with this, and believe that in the end we 
would be better off all things considered.” The defence also pointed to the fact that: 
¾ three other credit unions had notified ILCU of their intention to disaffiliate before 
June 2003;  
¾ credit unions established before August 2001 were not legally obliged to operate or 
participate in a savings protection scheme; and 
¾ annual accounts of three non-ILCU credit unions showed that they had operated 
successfully without access to the SPS for a number of years. One of these had 
been disaffiliated by ILCU in 1998 for breach of the LP/LS requirement.  
The Authority’s economic expert argued (a) that credit unions might not have believed 
that ILCU would disaffiliate them, in spite of the rules; and (b) more credit unions might 
have left ILCU to join CUDA in the absence of a tie-in. The first argument ignores the 
fact that ILCU had previously disaffiliated credit unions for failing to purchase LP/LS 
insurance from ECCU as well as documentary evidence indicating that, at least one of the 
CUDA credit unions knew that a breach of this rule would result in disaffiliation. No 
evidence was introduced to support the hypotheses that more credit unions would have 
left ILCU to join CUDA if they could retain access to ILCU’s SPS. 
The High Court judge nevertheless concluded: “On any view, it is extremely important 
for a credit union to be covered by an SPS. This requirement will clearly discourage 
ILCU member credit unions from leaving ILCU, thus preventing, restricting or distorting 
competition in the market for representation services.”39
 
(b) The Tying Argument. 
The issue of tying has been the subject of considerable debate in the economics 
literature. Chicago economists have been highly dismissive of the view that tying can be 
anti-competitive arguing that, a firm that is dominant in the market for one product can 
extract the full monopoly rent from that product and gains nothing from trying to 
                                                 
39 High Court judgment at 167. 
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leverage its dominant position into the second market.40 A number of arguments have 
been developed which demonstrate that there are circumstances in which it may make 
sense for a firm that is dominant in one market to use tying as a way of extending its 
dominant position into a related market.41
If goods are complements, i.e. they are normally consumed together, then the Chicago 
“one monopoly profit” argument will generally hold true. As the products are consumed 
together, consumers will arguably focus on the combined price of the products. Suppose 
a firm is dominant in the case of one good but faces competition in the market for a 
complementary good. Trying to force customers to buy the complementary product from 
it makes no sense. The only reason for doing so is so that it can charge above the 
competitive price for the complement. If it increases the price of the complement, this 
will increase the combined price, so that any increase in profits of the tied good will be 
offset by lower sales and profits for the tying good.  Even if the goods are not perfect 
complements, the gains from charging a higher price for the tied good will need to offset 
the losses on the tying good.42
An alternative explanation of tying in the case of complementary goods is that its 
objective is to protect existing monopoly profits on the tying good rather than to extract 
additional monopoly profits. There are two possible reasons for this. Rival firms in the 
competitive market may, as a result of participating in that market, obtain the capability 
to enter the tying good market. Tying to foreclose the competitive market, may represent 
a way of preventing this. Alternatively the incumbent firm may face potential entrants in 
both markets, in which case tying may be designed to force competitors to enter both 
markets simultaneously, thus reducing the likelihood of successful entry. The Authority 
argued, and the judge accepted, that it would not be possible for alternative providers of 
credit union representation services to provide SPS services as it would require a very 
large number, possibly several hundred credit unions to participate in such an 
                                                 
40 See, for example, R. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economics Perspective, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1976.  
41 On this point see, for example, M. Whinston, “Tying, Foreclosure and Exclusion”, (1990) 80 American 
Economic Review, 4: 837. 
42 Department of Trade and Industry, Bundling, Tying, and Portfolio Effects, DTI Economics Paper No. 1, 
Department of Trade and Industry, London, 2003. 
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arrangement.43 If entry to the SPS market was not possible then neither of these anti-
competitive theories of tying would apply. 
In the case of independent goods there is arguably less incentive to impose a tie. A 
firm that was dominant in one market could, nevertheless impose a tie in order to try and 
drive rivals out of another market by committing itself to a more aggressive pricing 
policy in that market. Such behaviour might enable the firm to discourage entry or induce 
exit, allowing it to gain market power in the second market. As the Authority’s own 
expert pointed out, however, this can only be profitable if it succeeds in forcing a rival 
out of the second market, or sufficiently weakening it so that it is no longer a serious 
competitor. If it does not effectively eliminate competition, tying in these circumstances 
increases the intensity of price competition, benefiting consumers, at the expense of the 
firms. 
An obvious difficulty in the ILCU case was that the tie had not eliminated 
competition, although it is recognised that this is not essential to establish that tying is 
abusive. In fact a rival credit union representative body had been established. The 
Authority’s economist argued, however, that there “is a high probability that without 
access to the SPS, CUDA will be unable to continue as a significant competitor in the 
credit union representation services market.”44 The judge accepted this argument and 
concluded: “I conclude that it is incontestable in the present case that ILCU's conduct 
may in time foreclose the market, but already it certainly distorts and weakens it.”45  
Gorecki argues that an economics based approach is superior to a form based approach 
in abuse of dominance cases.46 Salinger observes that an economics based approach to 
abuse of dominance cases involves setting out a theory of anti-competitive behaviour in 
model form as this requires a rigorous analysis of why (a) a practice is profitable and (ii) 
                                                 
43 A US credit union expert retained by ILCU stated that even a relatively small number of credit unions 
could establish an SPS. As it was not a deposit insurance scheme, the requirement to have a large number 
of participants in order to ensure sufficient diversity of risk, as argued by witnesses for the Authority, did 
not arise. Had the Authority argued that entry was possible in the SPS market, it would have undermined its 
claim that loss of access to ILCU’s SPS was a barrier to credit unions leaving ILCU and joining another 
representative body and thus prevented entry of new credit union representative bodies. The Authority 
argued that SPS and representation services were independent goods rather than complements.  
44 High Court judgment at 133. 
45 High Court judgment at 159. 
46 P. Gorecki, “Form Versus Effects-Based Approaches to the Abuse of a Dominant Position: The Case of 
Ticketmaster Ireland”, (2006), 2 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 3, 533. 
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why it is harmful.47 The economic foundations of the Authority’s tying claim appear to 
have been somewhat tenuous. Given that the competitive effects of tying are ambiguous, 
the obvious question is whether there was sufficient evidence to enable the court to 
distinguish between pro- and anti-competitive behaviour in this specific case. At the very 
least one might ask whether the finding that ILCU’s conduct “may in time foreclose the 
market” is sufficient to find the “tying arrangements” anti-competitive.  
 
(c) Refusal to Supply. 
ILCU had argued that, in seeking to have the Court order that ILCU should grant non-
member credit unions access to the SPS, the Authority was effectively arguing that the 
SPS was an essential facility. It argued that the criteria set by the European Court of 
Justice in Oscar Bronner were not satisfied in this case.48 The judge found that the SPS 
was not an essential facility noting that “while access to the SPS is extremely important 
and desirable, I do not think it can ultimately be described as essential, at least not in the 
sense in which that word is used when describing certain infrastructural services without 
which a competitor simply cannot function”.49 He then referred a number of factors in 
support of this point: 
1. Credit unions in Northern Ireland operated without savings protection or deposit 
guarantee insurance. 
2. CUDA credit unions had continued to grow their turnover from the time of their 
disaffiliation from ILCU without SPS, albeit, they claimed, at a significant 
disadvantage. 
3. A number of large credit unions had elected to “go it alone” without savings 
protection. 
He concluded therefore: 
“For these reasons, I do not see that having access to a savings protection scheme 
is absolutely indispensable in the short term to the provision by a representative 
body of credit union representation services. Such a body may function for a time 
                                                 
47 M. Salinger, (2005): Can Economics Bridge the Atlantic? Monopolization Under Section 2, Dominance 
Under Article 82 and Fouls in Football, Federal Trade Commission, mimeo. 
48 Case c-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitings-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & 
Co. KG, [1998] ECR I–1799.    
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without it, just as a householder may elect to forego house insurance, or an 
employer may forego accident cover for employees.”50
Both case law and economic theory recognise that the fact that it may be difficult for 
rival firms to operate in a market without access to a particular facility owned by a 
dominant incumbent does not mean that such a facility constitutes an essential facility.51 
The conclusion that SPS did not constitute an essential facility because there was 
evidence of credit unions operating without SPS in Northern Ireland and to a lesser extent 
in the Republic of Ireland sits somewhat uneasily with the High Court’s findings that the 
need for SPS cover would discourage credit unions from leaving ILCU and joining a rival 
body. 
  
(d) Consumer Harm. 
Most economists would take the view that behaviour should not be considered anti-
competitive in the absence of evidence of harm to consumers. As Vickers put it: 
“In the limit, the idea that there could be harms to the competitive process, 
justifying competition policy intervention, that are not even capable of harming 
consumers is unattractive. Competition to serve the needs of the general public of 
consumers – not some abstract notion of competition for its own sake – is the point 
of competition policy.”52
Similarly Gorecki observed: “Allegations of abuse should be addressed by asking: are 
consumers harmed by the conduct of the dominant firm?”53 This point is also recognised 
in DG Competition’s consultation paper on Article 82. “For a refusal to supply to be 
abusive, it must, however, have a likely anticompetitive effect on the market which is 
detrimental to consumer welfare.” 54
                                                                                                                                                 
49 High Court judgment at 152. 
50 High Court judgment at 153. 
51 This was recognised by the European Court of Justice in Oscar Bronner, for example. For a discussion 
on the economics of the essential facilities doctrine see, for example, P. Areeda, “Essential Facilities: An 
Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles”, (1989), 58 Antitrust Law Journal, 3 841 and G. Werden, “The Law 
and Economics of the Essential Facility Doctrine”, (1987), 32 Saint Louis University Law Journal, 2 433.   
52 Above note 2 at 259. 
53 Above note 46 at 533. 
54 Above at note 2. 
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Evidence of consumer harm is arguably all the more necessary when allegations of 
anti-competitive behaviour are advanced by rivals of the supposedly dominant firm. 
The Competition Authority argued that the exclusion of rival providers of credit union 
representation services resulted in higher prices for credit union representation services to 
the detriment of credit unions and ultimately their members. The Authority provided no 
evidence to support this allegation of consumer harm. The defence pointed out that the 
majority of credit unions paid higher rates of interest on savings than the banks and 
argued that this suggested that ILCU did not operate to the detriment of consumers.55
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Supreme Court judgment lies in its ruling 
that consumer welfare is the sole objective of competition law. 
“The entire aim and object of competition law is consumer welfare. Competitive 
markets must serve the consumer. That is their sole purpose. Competition law, as if 
often said, is about protecting competition, not competitors, even if it is competitors 
who most frequently invoke it.”56  
 
(e) Other Issues. 
The High Court had ordered ILCU to supply SPS services to credit unions regardless 
of whether or not they were ILCU members. This raises an obvious question. Would 
ILCU have established an SPS if it had anticipated that it would be compelled to allow 
non members to participate or would it have decided that this was a public good that 
should be provided by the State? In other words, the finding that refusal to provide SPS 
services to non-members amounted to an abuse of a dominant position, is based on an ex 
post evaluation when arguably the correct approach is to consider the position ex ante and 
ask whether such a requirement might remove the incentive to establish such a scheme at 
all.  
 
9. Procedural Issues. 
                                                 
55 Average interest rates paid to households by Irish financial institutions other than credit unions were 
around 2% during 2003. According to ILCU Annual Report 2003, 50% of credit unions paid members a 
dividend of 3-3.99% on their savings while a further 15% paid members dividends of 4-4.99% and 1.5% 
paid 5-5.99%. 
56 Supreme Court judgment at 38. Article 81 of course allows of efficiency gains arguments, hence in 
principle it is concerned with efficiency as well as consumer welfare considerations 
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The Supreme Court judgment referred to the roles of the courts and the Competition 
Authority in the application of competition law in Ireland, noting that in contrast to the 
EU and most other Member States, in Ireland the issue of deciding breaches of 
competition law is a matter for the courts. Referring to the role of the Authority, the 
Supreme Court stated: “The Authority has not made any decision other than to institute 
proceedings. It identifies market conduct and invites the Court to condemn it. There is no 
prima facie legal presumption in favour of the Authority’s view. The Authority carries 
the normal civil burden of proof.”57 Irish courts normally adopt a degree of judicial 
deference to a regulatory body with decision making powers in respect of an appeal or 
judicial review of a decision. The Court judgment establishes that such deference should 
not apply when the Authority brings proceedings alleging an infringement of competition 
law. 
 The High Court judge adopted an active role in the management of the case from an 
early stage. In particular he directed the parties to prepare a summary of issues agreed 
between them and a memorandum of issues agreed and in dispute. This seems to have 
been prompted by concerns that a number of competition cases involving private litigants 
that had previously come before the Irish courts proved to be extremely long drawn out 
affairs. 
An interesting development, at least in an Irish legal context, was the decision by the 
judge to appoint an economist to advise on the merits of the economic evidence.58 The 
relative novelty of this approach meant that the role of the Court’s economist was 
somewhat unclear. The judge indicated that the economist would assist him by explaining 
the economic evidence and that, if his decision was in conflict with the views of the 
economic assessor, the judge would inform the parties and ask for submissions on the 
views of the assessor. As it transpired this did not arise. A further complication arose 
because of the fact that the judge announced his decision to appoint an economist to 
assist him after both sides’ economic experts had completed giving their testimony. 
Consequently the assessor was confined to reviewing the written reports and transcripts 
of the oral evidence presented by the two experts. In particular, as he was not present 
                                                 
57 Supreme Court judgement at 38. 
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while they were giving their evidence, he could not suggest possible questions which the 
judge might have addressed to them. 
The issues of case management and the appointment of independent court experts are 
both issues that have been addressed at some length in new procedures which have been 
drawn up for the hearing of competition cases since the ILCU case.59 The new rules 
provide that the Judge in charge of the High Court Competition List can direct that any 
expert witnesses in a case consult with each other to: 
¾ identify the issues in respect of which they intend to give evidence; 
¾ reach agreement, where possible, on the evidence they intend to give in respect 
of these issues; and 
¾ provide a memo to the Judge and to the parties detailing the outcome of their 
consultations.60 
The rules also provide that the proceedings be subject to a ‘case management 
conference’. This conference will be chaired and regulated by the Judge and must be 
attended by solicitors for each party.61 The moving party must prepare a case booklet to 
be lodged and served on the other party not later than four clear days before the case 
management conference.62 The Court can appoint an expert to advise the Court. Where it 
considers it appropriate in the interests of justice, parties will be informed of such advice 
or information and will be allowed an opportunity to make submissions on it.63 A party 
intending to introduce oral evidence must serve on the other side a written statement 
outlining the essential elements of the evidence, signed and dated by the expert witness. 
This statement may, in exceptional circumstances, be treated as the evidence in chief of 
the witness.64
These rules should address some of the procedural issues that arose during the ILCU 
case. They clarify the role of expert witnesses and of independent experts appointed to 
advise the Court. The provisions regarding exchanges between experts should avoid the 
                                                                                                                                                 
58 The use of court appointed assessors in competition cases was recommended in The Final Report of the 
Competition and Merger Review Group, Dublin: Stationery Office, March 2000.  
59 Rules of the Superior Courts (Competition Proceedings), 2005, SI 130/2005, Dublin: Stationery Office. 
60 Id. Rule 6(1)(ix). 
61 Id. Rule 13(1). 
62 Id. Rule 13 (9)-(10). 
63 Id. Rule 23. 
64 Id. Rule 27. 
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situation where one party significantly alters its case at the last minute as the Authority 
had done in ILCU. 
 
10. Conclusions. 
The ILCU case was significant in a number of respects. It was the first abuse of 
dominance case brought by the Competition Authority and the first Irish competition case 
since the introduction of Regulation/1/2003. Since the case was heard, new rules have 
been introduced governing the hearing of competition cases which should facilitate the 
trial of such cases in the future. 
The Supreme Court overturned the High Court judgement on the grounds that there 
was no evidence to support the Authority’s contention that SPS constituted a distinct 
product and that there was a market for the provision of SPS services. The Court also set 
out its views orbiter dicta on the Authority’s claim that credit union representation 
services constituted a distinct product market. Had such a finding been upheld it would 
arguably have had profound implications for all sorts of trade and professional 
associations. Most important of all the Supreme Court has stated that consumer welfare is 
the sole objective of competition law. 
A disturbing aspect of the High Court judgement, from an economics perspective, is 
its continuation of the trend by the Irish judiciary to reject quantitative evidence in favour 
of subjective tests in respect of the key issue of market definition. The EU Commission 
decision in Virgin/British Airways unfortunately provides support for such an approach. 
The Supreme Court, however, appeared to suggest that quantitative evidence was to be 
preferred to intuitive approaches to market definition.  
Other aspects of the High Court judgement are also somewhat unsatisfactory, 
particularly as these were not addressed by the Supreme Court. There was evidence that 
ILCU was forced to amend its pricing policies, which is inconsistent with the finding that 
it had a dominant position. Equally, while economic theories suggest that for tying to be 
anti-competitive it must eliminate or seriously weaken competitors, the evidence in this 
instance was that a new entrant had managed to recruit some of the largest credit unions 
in the State. The High Court judgment illustrates the problems involved in asking 
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national courts to decide on complex economic issues which has implications for the 
adoption of a more economics based approach to applying Article 82. 
The case ultimately argued by the Authority only emerged rather late in the day and 
was rather different from that on which it had initially decided to bring proceedings. This 
raises questions about the initial decision to bring proceedings and, in particular, the 
economic theory that underlay that decision. The Supreme Court clearly indicated its 
unease at the repeated shifts in the Authority’s position. 
“It is not altogether surprising that the Authority had failed to provide a convincing 
analysis of ILCU’s activities as being anti-competitive. The history shows that it has 
changed its position in relation to ILCU on several occasions. It was permitted finally 
to change its stance from that advanced in the statement of claim only because Mr 
Collins decided not to object, believing that this radical change of position 
demonstrated the lack of credibility in the Authority’s case. It certainly seems to me to 
undermine confidence in the Authority’s consistency.”65
Massey and Daly have criticised the Authority’s record on enforcement.66 The 
Authority has stated that it only has the capacity to complete one criminal cartel 
investigation and bring a handful of civil actions in any one year with its existing 
resources.67 In six and a half years up to the end of 2002, the Authority received 404 
complaints alleging an abuse of dominance.68 Assuming that one third of these 
complaints were supported by reasonable evidence leaves 141cases.69 Prior to the ILCU 
case, the Authority had issued proceedings in only two such cases, neither of which went 
to a full hearing. The complainant CUDA included among its members some of the 
largest credit unions in the State. The Supreme Court stated that the Authority “appeared 
to stand in the shoes of potential complainant credit unions”.70 Given that the Authority 
                                                 
65 Supreme Court judgment at 52. 
66 Above note 12. 
67 Competition Authority Annual Report 2003. The Authority has indicated that abuse of dominance cases 
are likely to be dealt with by means of civil proceedings.  
68 The Authority’s 2003 Annual Report did not disclose the number of dominance complaints received in 
that year, the first time such figures were not included.  
69 The Authority’s 2001 Annual Report indicated that there were reasonable grounds to support around one 
third of abuse of dominance complaints received that year. This is the only year for which the Authority has 
published such information. Obviously there is no way of knowing whether the results for 2001 are 
representative of complaints received over the entire 1996-2002 period. 
70 Supreme Court judgment at 33. 
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can only bring a limited number of actions, one might ask why it felt it necessary to bring 
proceedings in a case where the complainants would appear to have been quite capable of 
bringing a private action. 
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